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UNREGISTERED DRAFT FOR INTERNAL PY DIVISION USE

23 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT: Evaluation of the National Psychological Program

REFERENCE:

- a. Memorandum for the Director, PSB, from the Executive Secretary, NSC (cc to SecState, SecDefense and DCI) 29 May 1952, Top Secret. Subject: Status of United States Programs for National Security.
- b. Questions Relating to Reference a addressed in draft form to CIA by [REDACTED] of the Evaluation Staff (Top Secret, R-123, 19 June 1952).

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1. Following are comments on reference b, in the context of part of that/reference a which reads:

"In connection with the national psychological program, the President has expressed particular interest in the status of the following:

4. Evaluation of the national psychological program, in terms of objectives, policies, capabilities and limitations."

2. What information is available through covert channels to indicate whether VOA broadcasts are effective, etc?

This seems a legitimate question, but is not one in connection with which CIA will be able to provide any useful answer for some time

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Completion of the psychological assets survey on or about 7 July 1952 will permit DCI to answer this question insofar as the current cold war potential is concerned. We feel, however, that it should be answered only in very general terms, and that the PSB should not be encouraged to ask specific questions of the kind which will be answered, for our own purposes, by the survey of psychological assets.

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7. Defectors.

As with the question on physical penetration of the Iron Curtain, it seems appropriate to ask CIA both about the number and character of defectors and about plans for increasing defection of key personnel.

8. Area Questions.

For the most part, these rather specific questions which follow are beyond the capabilities of CIA to answer at this time. Some are quite legitimate in that the answer would reflect on the total U.S. impact (e.g., number of defectors) and would be largely unavailable through other sources; some are in the nature of requests

for progress reports ([redacted])

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[redacted] . have aided the anti-Communist cause) but still seem relevant to the terms of reference a -- if we could answer them; some ask for judgments on the relative merit of types of propaganda and may be difficult to answer even after this branch is much further developed than it is now. [redacted]

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9. In summary, it is our view that most of the questions posed by [redacted] are relevant questions, so that we should keep them on file as a guide in the further development of the PY evaluation function, but that they are too specific and detailed for CIA to cope with them at the present time. We concur in the substitution of [redacted] draft containing four broad questions as to policy, achievement in terms of Soviet influence, employment of U.S. capabilities, and major deterrents to the successful prosecution of our psychological program.

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